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COMMENTS

TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONS-DIVIDENDS OR INTEREST-The difficulty of determining whether payments made by a corporation on its securities are dividends or interest has been highlighted
by two recent cases, involving substantially similar facts, which came
before the Supreme Court on review.1
In the John Kelley Company case, a corporation, all of whose common and preferred stock was owned by a family group, was reorganized. There were issued $250,000 worth of "income debenture bearer
bonds" under a trust indenture calling for 8 per cent interest, noncumulative. These securities had a maturity date twenty years after issue; the
interest was to be paid out of earnings; rights of the holders were subordinate to creditors but superior to stockholders; provision was made
for acceleration in_ case of specific default; the holders were given no
right to participate in management. Part of the "debentures" wei;e issued on subscription and the balance in exchange for all of the corporation's outstanding preferred stock which was retired. In the Talbot
Mills case, taxpayer, a family corporation, issued, in exchange for fourfifths of its outstanding capital stock, "registered notes" having a fixed
maturity date, and bearing interest at a variable rate from 2 per cent
to IO per cent computed with reference to.,profits. "Interest" payments
were deferable in the discretion of the corporation's directors and both
"interest" and principal were subordinate to claims of creditors.
In filing income tax returns for the years concerned, both taxpayers treated the payments made to the respective security-holders as
interest and deducted the payments from gross income. The commissioner assessed a deficiency on the ground that the payments were
dividends and p.ence nondeductible. In the John Kelley Company
case, the Tax Court decided in favor of the taxpayer 2 but the circuit
court of appeals reversed. 3 In the Talbot Mills case, the Tax Court
1 John Kelley Co. v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, Talbot Mills v. Same (U.S.
1946) 66 S. Ct. 299.
2 John Kelley Co. v. Comm., I T.C. 457 (1943).
3 Comm. v. John Kelley Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 146 F. (2) 466.
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found for the government 4 and the circuit court of appeals affirmed. 5
The Supreme Court held that the findings by the Tax Court that payments in the John Kelley Company case were interest and that payments in the Talbot Mills case were dividends were conclusive and
could not b.e disturbed by the reviewing tribunals. Accordingly, the
decision of the circuit court of appeals in the Kelley case was reversed
and the decision in the Talbot Mills case was a:ffi.rmed.8
The majority of the Supreme Court, in the principal !=3,Se, refused
to consider the merits of the controversy, on the theory that the rule of
the Dobson case,7 as applied to the situation before the Court, required
approval of the Tax Court's conclusions.8 The problems here raised as
to the scope of judicial review qf the Tax Court's determinations are of
first importance.9 However, this comment will be restricted to the
substantive question that still confronts the Tax Court, and primary
·_consideration will be given to a number of recent decisions of that
. tribunal.10
•
'Talbot Mills Co. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 95 (1944).·
11 Talbot Mills Co. v. Comm., (C.C.A. 1st, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 809.
8 Justice Black concurred in the result of the Talbot Mills case and dissented in the
Kelley case holding that the decision of the circuit court of appeals should' be· affi.irmed
in that case for the reason set forth- in the opinion therein. Thus Justice Black favored
the conclusion that the payments were dividends in both cases. Justice Burton concurred
in the result of the Kelley case and dissented from the result in the Talbot Mills case
on the grounds stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Magruder. Thus Justice
Burton favors the conclusion that the payments were interest in both cases. Justice
Rutledge, in his dissenting opinion (principal case at 304), took the position that the
circuit courts of appeals should be affirmed in both cases for reasons set forth at length
by him. Thus Justice Rutledge reaches the conclusion that the payments were dividends
in both cases.
7 Dobson
Comm., 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239 (1943).
8 For a discussion of the Dobson· case see Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner; The
Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1944), cit~d in footnote
8 of the principal case; p. 304.
9 Justice Magruder in his dissenting opinion in the Talbot case [ 146 F. (2d)
809] asserted that the rule of the Dobson case did not apply to the situation before the
court. He wrote, at p. 814, "This is not even the kind of legal question with which
the Tax Court may be assumed to have specialized familiarity, for the legal effect of the
instruments as constituting an indebtedness, may arise in many ways outside the tax
field, • • ." To this extent, at least, the principal case is an extension of the Dobson
case. In the latter case, the Tax Court was dealing with a matter of tax accounting
{the "Tax Benefit Rule"), a field in which it could be assumed tliat the Tax Court
had acquired a high degree of specialized competence. Justice Rutledge, in his dissenting opinion in the principal case (66 S. Ct. 299 at 304), takes the view that the
decisions of the Tax Court in the Kelley and Talbot cases are inconsistent with each
other and therefore concludes that the rule of the Dobsol/- case is made to apply in
such a way as to foster inconsistencies in the law when it was one of the very purposes
of that decision to avoid such inconsistencies.
10 In the opinion of the writer, the application of the Dobson case to this specific
situation will require circuit courts of appeals to affirm Tax Court decisions in all
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Interest paid or accrued during the taxable year is allowed as a
deduction from gross income.11 Dividends paid by a corporation may
not be taken by it as a deduction.12 The problem of determining
whether a payment is interest or dividends within the meaning of the
statute 18 arises when the corporation has created hybrid securities,
issued and outstanding, which incorporate some of the usual features of
bonds or other types of corporate indebtedness on the one hand and of
shares of stock on the other.14 This problem has given rise to a great
deal of litigation.15 Over a relatively short period, running from October 22, 1942 to August 31, 1944, the Tax Court has handed down
eight decisions 16 turning on the question of whether corporate payments
were interest or dividends. As the earlier decisions have been dealt with
elsewhere,17 this comment will concentrate on the more recent cases
in an attempt to determine what factors, if any, are given greater
weight by the Tax Court in tipping the scale to one side or the other.18
cases involving the question whether payments by a corporation to its stockholders or
bondholders are interest or dividends, since as a practical matter there will always be
some factual evidence before the Tax Court pointing to either dividends or interest.
In the light of the principal case, it would be a hardy taxpayer, indeed, who would
appeal a decision of the Tax Court on this point.
11 Internal Revenue Code,§ 23(b).
12 Internal Revenue Code, § II5(a) defines dividends.
TREAS, REG. 103,
§ 19.23(b)-1, provides: "So called interest on preferred stock, which is in reality a
dividend thereon, cannot be deducted in computing net income."
18 See notes II and 1 2, supra.
·
14 For a discussion of various types of hybrid securities see· Berl, "The Vanishing
Distinction Between Creditors and Stockholders," 76 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 814 (1928).
15 See 4 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §§ 26.09 and 26.10
(1942).
16 Industrial Additions Assn. v. Comm., I T.C. 378 (19_42) (dividends); taxpayer's appeal dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 141 F.
(2d) 636 (1944), on the ground of untimeliness of petition for review; reversed and·
remanded on this point by the Supreme Court, 323 U.S. 310, 65 S. Ct. 289 (1945);
thereafter the Tax Court's decision was affirmed on the merits by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 149 F. (2d) 294 (1945); Northern Refrigerator Line,
Inc. v. Comm., l T.C. 824 (1943) (dividends); John Wanamaker Philadelphia v.
Comm., 1 T.C. 937 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 139_F. (2d) 690 (dividends); Golden Belt Lumber Co. v. Comm., 1 T.C. 741 (1943) (dividends); Green
Bay and Western Ry. Co. and Ahnapee & Western Ry. Co. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 372
(1944) (dividends), affirmed, (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 585; Verifine Dairy
Products Corp. of Sheboygan, Inc. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 269 (1944) (dividends); John
Kelley Co. v. Comm., 1 T.C. 457 (1943) (principal case) (interest), reversed by the
circuit court of appeals, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 466, reversed by the Supreme
Court, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 299; Talbot Mills Co. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 95 (1944)
(principal case) (dividends), affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 146 F. (2d)
So, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 66 S. Ct. 299.
17 See note 15, supra, and 40 CoL. L. REV. 1084 (1940);
18 See note 16, supra.
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The factors given consideration in the Kelley case 19 were set out by
the Tax Court in the following terms: "The determining factors are
usually listed as the name given to the certificates, the presence or absence of maturity date, the source of the payments, the right to enforce
the payment of principal and interest, participation in management,
status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors, and
intent of the parties." 20 The corporation's own designation of a certificate as a bond or note is not given much weight by the Tax Court,21
while, on the other hand, the listing of a certificate as stock, is considered more indicative of the nature of the payment.22 The presence
of a fixed maturity date when the payment of the principal sum may be
demanded by the security-holder tends to lead to the conclusion that
a debtor-creditor relationship exists. 23 If payments are to be made out
of corporate earnings only, the inference is that the payments are
dividends, for this tends to indicate that the risk of the business is borne
by the security-holders while payments that must be made whether
earnings are sufficient to warrant them or not, are more properly characterized as interest. 24 Participation in management by the cettificate
holders is on the dividend side of the picture.25 Status equal to or su19
2

S~e 1 T.C. 457 at 462 (1943).

°Cited with approval by the Tax Court in Talbot Mills Co. v.

Comm., 3 T.C.
95 at 99 (1944).
21 Talbot Mills v. Comm., 3 T.C. 95 (1944) (certificates referred to as "reg, istered notes"; payments held to be dividends) ; Greenbay & Western Ry. Co. and
Ahnapee & Western Ry. Co. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 372 (1944). (certificates called "debentures"; payments held to be dividends); 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION,§ 26.10, p. ,555 (1942).
22 Industrial Addition Assn. v. Comm., l T.C. 378 (1942) (dividends); Northern Refrigerator Line, Inc. v. Comm., I T.C. 824 (1943) (dividends); John Wanamaker Philadelphia v. Comm., I T.C. 937 (1943) (dividends); Verifine Dairy
Products Corp. of Sheboygan, Inc. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 269 (1944) (dividends). The
certificates involved in the above cases were referred to as stock.
23 In Industrial Addition Association v. Comm., I T.C. 378, the court quotes at
385 from United States v. South Ga. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 3
at 5, as follows: "There is, thus an entire absence here of the most significant, if not the
essential feature of a debtor and creditor as opposed to a stockholder relationship, the
existence of a fixed maturity for the principal sum with the right to force payment
of the sum as a debt in the event of default." See also 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION,§ 26.10, pp. 556, 557 (1942).
24 Northern Refrigerator Line, Inc.
Comm., I T.C. 824 (1943); John Wanamaker Philadelphia v. Comm., I T.C. 937 (1943); Green Bay & Western Ry. Co. and
Ahnapee & Western Ry. Co. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 372 (1944).
25 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 26.10, p. 557 (1942);
Green Bay & Western Ry. Co. and Ahnapee & Western Ry. Co. 3 T.C. 372 at 379
(1944), "It is true that the holders of these debentures had no vote and could not
participate in the management of the company, but that is by no means uncommon to
holders of proprietary interests."

v.

COMMENTS

perior to that of general corporate creditors points to the payments as
interest.20 Intent of the parties to create a debtor-creditor relationship
between the shareholder and the corporation suggests that the payments
are interest, while an intent to give the certificate holders a proprietary
interest in the corporation leads to the contrary conclusion.27 Which of
these factors is given the greatest weight by the Tax Court in deciding
the controversy of dividends vs. interest? At least this much may be
said: The writer has been unable to find any case holding the payments
to be interest when they were payable out of the earnings of the corporation only and when the securities did not have a fixed date of
maturity ( a promise to repay the principal sum at a date certain in the
future). 28 Capital invested on these terms is uniformly held to be
"risk" capital. It is only in situations involving securities having a fixed
maturity date on the one hand and providing for payments to be made
out of earnings only, on the other hand, that the additional factors,
mentioned above, seem to be given weight by the Court 29 and it is the
net effect of these additional factors that decides the particular case.
This is illustrated by the diverse results reached by the Tax Court in
the Kelley and Talbot cases. In both of these cases payments were to
4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 26.10, p. 556 (1942).
Verifine Dairy Products Corp. of Sheboygan, Inc. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 269 at 276
(1944), "In determining a question of this kind, of extreme importance is the intent
of the parties."
28
Industrial Addition Assn. v. Comm., l T.C. 378 (1942); John Wanamaker
Philadelphia v. Comm., 1 T.C. 937 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 139 F.
(2d) 644; Golden Belt Lumber Co. v. Comm., l T.C. 741 (1943); Green Bay &
Western Ry. and Ahnapee & Western Ry. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 372 (1944), affirmed,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 585; Ticker Publishing Co., 46 B.T.A. 399 (1942);
Comm. v. Schmoll Fils Assn., Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) IIO F. (2d) 6u; Parisian
Inc. v. Comm., (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 394; Northern Refrigerator Line,
Inc. v. Comm., l T.C. 824 (1943) (A definite maturity date was provided for only
if payment could be made without impairment of capital. The Court, in holding the
payments made to be dividends, emphasizes that the qualification of the definite
maturity date indicated that there was not a debtor-creditor relationship).
29
Verifine Dairy Products Corp. of Sheboygan, Inc. v. Comm., 3 T.C. 269 (1944)
(payments on so-called "preferred stock" payable out of earnings and having a fixed
maturity date held to be dividends-weight given to nomenclature, intent of the
parties, and status of certificate holders in relation to general creditors); John Kelley
Co. v. Comm., l T.C. 457 (1943) (weight given to nomenclature, status of certificate
holders and management participation in holding the payments interest); Talbot
Mills v. Comm., 3 T.C. 95 (1945) (weight given to the intent of the parties, deferment of payments, and issuance of new certificates exclusively to owners of old certificates exclusively to owners of old certificates in holding the payments to be dividends);
H.R. de Milt Co., 7 B.T.A. 7 (1927) (interest-weight given to name used and
intent of the parties); United States v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., (C.C.A. 6th,
1943) 133 F. (2d) 990 (interest-weight giwen to cumulative feature of payments
and non-participation in management by certificate holders).
26
27
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be made out of earnings only 80 and there was a fixed maturity on both
obligations. The Tax Court in the Talbot case held that the following
differences between the securities in that case and the Kelley case were
sufficient to warrant a different conclusion: "In John Kelley Co . ..•
there was ~ flat rate of interest, though payable out of income, as contrasted with the variable, profit-determined rate of the Talbot notes;
the interest payments 'Were due whenever the net income was sufficient, with provision for suit in case of default in punctual payment,
whereas in the instant case [Talbot] the payment of interest might be
deferred, though the net income was sufficient, for such time as the
directors might see fit, and the debentures remaining after the exchange
were issued on subscription to the stockholders, whereas this transaction was exclusively an exchange." 31 In the opinion of the writer,
none of these factors alone or in combination warrants calling one of
the payments interest and the other dividends.82 In view of the purpose
of the particular statute,88 when~ payments are to be made by the corporation solely out of earnings, such payments should be considered
dividends whether there is ::J. fixed maturity date on the obligation or
not.84 All other factors should be considered irrelevant. As the above
analysis has attempted to demonstrate, this conclusion is reached by
the Tax Court in every case where a lack of a fixed maturity date is
added to the fact that payments are to be made out of earnings only.85
The policy of allowing a deduction for interest and not for dividends
would be adhered to if the Internal Revenue Code were amended to
provide that payments by a corporation on its certificates are taxable
as dividends when the certificate requires payments to be made out of
earnings only. 86 But it might be advisable for Congress, before amending the Code in this respect, to reconsider-the entire subject,of double
30 In the Talbot case 2 per cent interest was guaranteed but the interest in greater
part was dependent on earnings of the corporation and all payments could be deferred in
the discretion of the directors.
81 3 T.C. 95 ,at 99 (1944).
82 See dissent of Justice Rutledge, principal case at 304.
38 Internal Revenue Code, § 23 (b).
84 As Justice Rutledge points out in the principal case, at 305, a remote right
of suit for enforcement of payment some twenty-five years in the future varies but
slightly from the right of preferred stockholders to share in the corporation's assets
on dissolution. The reason for the passage of § 23(b), Internal Revenue Code might
well have been the unfairness of taxing an individual or corporation on something
it was required to pay out, i.e., interest, whether there were earnings or not. Such
inequity does not exist when the corporation is required to make payments only when
there are earnings.
85 See note 28, supra.
86 The author of the decision note in 40 CoL. L. REv. 1084 ( I 940) suggested
that a similar test be applied by the courts. It is the opinion of the author of this
comment that the present confused situation can best be remedied by legislation.
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taxation of corporate earnings.87 The present system of double taxation
of corporate earnings favors debtor financing by corporations and is
responsible, in a large measure, for the issuance of the hybrid types of
securities discussed above.88 A decision by Congress that corporate
earnings should be taxed only when paid to shareholders would lead to
statutory revisions eliminating the problem dealt with in this comment.89
Milton D. Solomon, S.Ed.

MAGILL, TAXABLE lNcoME, rev. ed., 26 (1945).
GuTHMANN & DouGALL, CoRPORATE FINANCIAL PoLICY 519 (1942). A
study of the cases discussed in this note is also illustrative of this point.
89 It is recognized that the problem herein discussed presents only a single phase
of the whole complex subject of double taxation.
87

88

